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IN THE SUPREME rCOURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN HOLDING COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

-vsPARKER G HANSON and GARDA P.
HANSON, his \Vife,

)

11743

Defendants and Respondents. ,

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Appellant against Respondents to have declared terminated, because of certain
breaches of lea,se, a certain Agreement to Lease entered
into by and between Appellant'is assignor and Respondents.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon Motions for Summary Judgment filed by both the
Appellant and Respondents herein, the District Court of the
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Fifth Judicial District in and for the County of Washington,
State of Utah, found that there were no genuine and material issues of fact involved in the matter and found as a
matter of law that Respondents were entitled to judgment
of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the ruling of the lower court
granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and
seeks judgment of this court granting Appellant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 1961 B. & E. Securities, Inc., a Utah Corporation, as Lessor, entered into a certain Agreement to
Lease with Respondents as Lessee, wherein Respondents
did lease from said Lessor certain property located in Lot
5, Block 15, Plat A, St George City Survey as more particularly described in said Agreement to Lease. (Exhibit
P-1) Subsequent to the execution of the Agreement to
Lease, the original Lessor did assign all its right in said
Agreement to Appellant and also conveyed its interest in
the leased property to the Appellant. (R-2) Among other
provisions, the Agreement to Lease in question contained
the following statements:
A. "In the event that Hansons fail, neglect or refuse
to pay the rentals as above set forth. the Company
may terminate this Lease by proper notice of said
breach ... " (Exhibit P-1, Page 2)
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B. "To pay all utility bil1s levied and assessedd against

said building or the occupants thereof, in the
amounts so assessed and before delinquency." (Exhibit P-1, Page 2)
C. "To pay all taxes that may be levied and assessed
against the personal property belonging to Hansons
that may be in said building, in the amounts so
assessed and before delinquency." (Exhibit P-1,
Page 2)
Subsequent to the execution of the said Agreement to
Lease, the Respondents took possession of the leased premises and have held possession, use, and control of the same
up to the present time. The Respondents made their monthly rental payments as called for by the Agreement to Lease
until March of 1965 when they became delinquent. (R. 35)
& 36). The delinquency continued up to September of 1966.
(R. 35 & 36)
On September 9, 1966 the Appellant, acting through its
attorney, caused to be mailed by U. S. Mail, Certified-Return Requested, letters advising the Respondents that they
were delinquent in their payments. (R. 56, 57, 58 & 59).
On October 4, 1966 an additional notice was mailed to the
Respondents advising them that they were delinquent in
their rental payments for the month of September, 1966.
( R. 60 & 61) Thereafter, the Respondents made periodic
payments on the lease rentals, but were continually delinquent up to and including the month of April, 1968 when
a payment of $178.56 was made to Appellant, which payment was the rental for the months of December, 1967 and

/
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January and February, 1968. (R. 35 & 36) No further
rental payments were made or tendered to Appellant until
December 4, 1968 when Respondents apparently mailed to
Appellant a check, the exact amount of which is unknown
to Appellant. claiming the check to be for back rental. (Deposition of Parker G. Hanson, Page 6) Appellant did not
accept the letter and it was returned by the Post Office to
Respondents. {Deposition of Parker G. Hanson, Page 6) On
December 12, 1968 the Appellant caused to be served upon
the Respondents a Notice of Termination of the Agreement
to Lease and requested in the Notice that Respondents deliver the possession of the leased premises to Appellant.
(Exhibit P-2) The Notice of Termination was based upon
the rental payment delinquencies and upon delinquencies in
the payment of personal property taxes and utility bills.
(Exhibit P-2) Respondents were delinquent in the payment
of personal property taxes on the leased premises and in the
payment of utility bills on said premises from approximately
the year 1965 to the date Appellant's notice was served upon
them. (R. 37, 38, 47 to 55) In regards to the delinquent
general property taxes, the Respondents had not conformed
to the requirements of Title 59, Chapter 4, Section 10, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. (R. 38)
Subsequent to the serving of the Notice to Quit and of
Termination upon Respondents as above set forth, and upon
their refusal to deliver possession of the leased premises,
the Appellant brought this action to have the Agreement
to Lease above mentioned declared terminated and for an
order delivering the possession of the premises to Appellant
and for attorney fees and costs (R. 1 to 6)
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POLNT ON APPEAL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING AND
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND GRANTLNG THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY RESPONDENTS.
ARGUMENT

Both parties hereto, by filing Motions for Summary
Judgment, in effect, admit that there are no material issues
of fact to be decided by the court. The fact that the delinquencies of Respondents in carrying out the parties' Agreement to Lease occurred are uncontroverted and are fully
set forth in the record. The only issue involved is whether
or not such delinquencies or breaches in the Agreement to
Lease were sufficient as a matter of law, to enable the Appellant to declare the Lease Agreement terminated.
"If it be stipulated in the Lease or Agreement under

which a tenant holds the demised premises that if he
be guilty of a breach of a particular covenant or stipulation, or generally, of any of the covenants in the
Lease, or stipulation in the Agreement, on his part to be
performed or observed, the landlord may re-enter and
the tenant be guilty of any such breach the landlord
may accordingly re-enter or bring ejectment". 1 McAdam on Landlord and tenant 815."
"A clause in a Lease which provides for its termination
at the election of the lessor, upon default in payment
of rent, although in the form of a stipulation. i.s still a
condition, since it provides for ending the term and
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forfeiture of the estate in case of default." I McAdam
on Landlord and tenant 821.
For other authority dealing with the validity of a provision for forfeiture in a Lease upon non-payment of rent,
see 51 CJS Pages 332 and 350.
The law in Utah seems to be that ordinarily unless a
Lease specifically so provides, failure to pay the rent does
not automatically terminate it and there must be a proper
demand for its payment King v. Firm, 3 Ut. 2d 419, 285 P.
2d 1114 {1955). On the other hand, any demand for the
payment of rent may be waived by an express provision in
the Agreement to Lease. King v. Firm, 3 Ut. 2nd 419, 285
P. 2d 1114, 1118; {1955); Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments,
14 Utah 2d, 250, 252, 381 P. 2d 735 (1963).
In this particular case, the Agreement to Lease provided,
in effect, that in the event the Respondents failed to pay
the rental as required therein, the Appellant could terminate the Lease by notice. (Exhibit P-1, Page 2, Paragraph
6). It ts contended by Appellant therefore, that the provision
of the Agreement to Lease providing for such termination
places this case in the same situation as the King and Shoemaker cases mentioned above and the Appellant herein
could terminate the Lease by giving notice without any
demand that the rental delinquency be paid prior to such
termination. The record in this case is clear that there was
a delinquency in the rental payments from February of 1968
to December of 1968, a period of ten months. In December
of that year the Appellant elected to declare a breach of
the Agreement to Lease and served notice upon the Re-
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spondents of such election. Under our law, as set forth in
the King and Shoemaker cases, the Agreement to Lease
between the parties hereto became terminated upon the
giving of notice to the Respondents.
It is anticipated that Respondents, in their arguments to
this court, will make some issue over the fact that they tendered by mail to Appellant any delinquent rental payment
due on December 4, 1968 and that the notice to them of the
termination of the Lease was not served upon them until
December 12, 1968. In this regard, the court's attention is
called to 51 CJS 352 wherein the following statement is
contained:
"It has been held that a landlord may rightfully refuse

to accept payment of past due rent since to accept the
belated payment would constitute a waiver."
Resopndens, in their arguments to the trial court at the
hearing of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment,
made considerable issue over the fact that the provisions of
Utah'is Forcible Entry and Detainer statutes contained in
Title 78, Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated. 1953 were not
followed by Appellant and therefore Appellant cannot claim
a termination of the parties' Agreement to Lease. It is anticipated that such a defense will be presented to this court.
The Utah Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute was in
part at least copied from the California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1159. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428,
150 P. 2d 100, 154 ALR 167 (1944). In the California ca,se
of Gilbert v Peck (Calif). 162 C 54, 121 P. 315 (1912) the
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California Court said as follows:
"The Code (Section 1159) does not undertake to make
the forcible entry proceeding the exclusive remedy
where facts showing a cause of action independent of
the Code provisions are alleged ... "
In 36A CJS 964 we find the following statement:
"A forcible entry and detainer proceeding is not exclusive but is cumulative of any other remedy that a
party may have."
In the case before the Court, no attempt has been made
to remove the Respondents from the leased premLses and,
in fact, and while the record may not show it, they are still
in possession of the leased premises. Rather this proceeding
is one to have declared terminated the Agreement to Lease
between the parties and thereafter to obtain an order removing them from the leased premises. None of the evi1s
for which our forcible entry and detainer statutes were
enacted are present in this case and there is no reason for
Appellant to be forced to rely upon the remedies contained
therein to the exclusion of all other remedies. It is submitted
by Appellant therefore, that it did not forfeit its other
remedies allowed it by law for failure to conform to the
above-mentioned statutes.
The courts have shown some reluctance to declare forfeitures of Lease Agreements and in many cases have found,
upon principa1s of equity, that breaches have been waived.
In such cases, however, the party claimed the operation of
equity must come into court with "clean hands."

9
In this case, the record shows a long series of defaults
rnd delinquencies on the part of the Respondents. It also
show,s wherein the Respondents were given adequate notice
that the Appellant would not allow the delinquencies to
continue. After the receipt of such notice, the Respondents
still allowed their rental payments to go delinquent for a
puiod of 10 months as well as being continually late in
making what rental payments they did make. Certainly a
lessor cannot be expected to continue to allow such activities to continue indefinitely nor should the courts sanction
such actions.
It is ,sulnnitted by Appellant that the record before the

court shows more than sufficient delinquency to allow Appellant to declare a breach of the parties' Agreement to
Lease, that the Appellant did elect to make such declaration and that the Agreement to Lease is now terminated
and of no further force and effect. It i,s further submitted
that the trial court erred in finding no cause of action on
the part of Appellant and the decision of that court should
be reversed and Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment
granted herein.
CONCLUSION
The election of Appellant to terminate the parties' Agreement to Lease was proper and based upon ,sufficient grounds.
The court should reserve the trial court's decision and grant
judgment in favor of Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
PHILLIP L. FOREMASTER
75 North 100 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant

